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Abstract—Information leakage rate is an intuitive metric that
reflects the level of security in a wireless communication system,
however, there are few studies taking it into consideration.
Existing work on information leakage rate has two major
limitations due to the complicated expression for the leakage
rate: 1) the analytical and numerical results give few insights
into the trade-off between system throughput and information
leakage rate; 2) and the corresponding optimal designs of trans-
mission rates are not analytically tractable. To overcome such
limitations and obtain an in-depth understanding of information
leakage rate in secure wireless communications, we propose an
approximation for the average information leakage rate in the
fixed-rate transmission scheme. Different from the complicated
expression for information leakage rate in the literature, our
proposed approximation has a low-complexity expression, and
hence, it is easy for further analysis. Based on our approximation,
the corresponding approximate optimal transmission rates are
obtained for two transmission schemes with different design
objectives. Through analytical and numerical results, we find that
for the system maximizing throughput subject to information
leakage rate constraint, the throughput is an upward convex non-
decreasing function of the security constraint and much too loose
security constraint does not contribute to higher throughput;
while for the system minimizing information leakage rate subject
to throughput constraint, the average information leakage rate is
a lower convex increasing function of the throughput constraint.
I. Introduction
The inherent openness of wireless channel makes data
transmission difficult to shield from unintended recipients [1].
Although the security of wireless transmission is safeguarded
by traditional cryptographic techniques, an eavesdropper with
a strong computational ability still can decipher confidential
information from the received symbols by using brute-force
attacks [2]. In this situation, the transmitted information is
completely leaked to the eavesdropper over wireless channel,
which is the worst throughput-information leakage rate rela-
tion for securing wireless transmission. Physical layer security
has been proposed in [3] for ensuring secure wireless commu-
nications by exploiting the characteristics of wireless channels
without any assumption on the computation capability of
the eavesdropper. With the help of physical layer security,
more confidential information could be transmitted on secure
wireless transmission by introducing random noises into the
transmitted messages to confuse the eavesdropper. Hence, it
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is of great interest to investigate the throughput-information
leakage rate trade-off on secure transmission system.
Although there are many secure transmission designs taking
throughput into account, limited studies on information leak-
age rate are found in the literature. Specifically, [4] proposed
the average information leakage rate over quasi-static fading
channels, which tells how fast on average the information is
leaked to the eavesdropper, and examines average information
leakage rate in secure transmission design. The major limita-
tions in [4] are: 1) the analytical and numerical results give
few insights into the trade-off between system throughput and
information leakage rate; 2) and the corresponding optimal
designs of transmission rates are not analytically tractable.
Besides, implicit exponential integral function is involved in
the average information leakage rate, which hinders the further
research on information leakage rate in wireless communica-
tion systems.
In this work, we study the secure transmission design from
an information leakage perspective. To address the above
limitations, we reasonably approximate average information
leakage rate and, based on the approximation, two transmis-
sion systems are considered. The major contributions of this
paper are:
• We thoroughly study the secure transmission design from
an information leakage perspective. We propose a rea-
sonable approximation for average information leakage
rate. Based on the approximation, for the system max-
imizing throughput subject to information leakage rate
constraint, we obtain the closed-form approximate opti-
mal secure transmission rates; for the system minimizing
information leakage rate subject to throughput constraint,
we get the low-complexity approximate optimal secure
transmission rates.
• Based on the derived approximations, the throughput-
information leakage rate trade-offs over wireless commu-
nication systems are comprehensively investigated. It is
found that for the system maximizing throughput subject
to information leakage rate constraint, the throughput is
an upward convex non-decreasing function of security
constraint. However, for the system minimizing infor-
mation leakage rate subject to throughput constraint, the
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average information leakage rate is a lower convex in-
creasing function of the throughput constraint. In the both
systems, too stringent or too loose throughput constraints
will suffer the systems.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In
section II, we illustrate the secure transmission and problem
formulation, and in section III we detail the system design
with the proposed approximation. Next, section IV shows the
numerical results. Finally, the paper is concluded in section
V.
II. Secure Transmission and Problem Formulation
We consider the wiretap-channel system, where a trans-
mitter, Alice, sends confidential information to an intended
receiver, Bob, in the presence of an eavesdropper, Eve. Alice,
Bob and Eve are assumed to all have a single antenna. We
refer to the Alice-Bob channel as the main channel and
the Alice-Eve channel as the eavesdropper’s channel. Both
channels are assumed to undergo independent quasi-static
fading. Then, the instantaneous channel capacity of Bob or
Eve is given by
Ci = log2 (1 + γi) , i = b or e, (1)
where γi denotes the instantaneous signal-to-noise ratios
(SNRs), the subscripts b and e denote Bob and Eve, re-
spectively. We adopt the quasi-static Rayleigh fading channel
model, and the instantaneous SNR has an exponential distri-
bution, which is given by
f (γi) =
1
γ¯i
exp
(
−γi
γ¯i
)
, i = b or e, (2)
where γ¯i denotes the average received SNR at Bob or Eve.
A. Secure Encoding
We consider the widely-adopted wiretap code [5] for con-
fidential message transmissions. Specifically, there are two
transmission rates, namely, the codeword transmission rate,
Rb, and the confidential information rate, Rs. The rate cost
for providing secrecy is defined as the positive rate difference
between Rb and Rs, which is expressed as
φ = Rb − Rs. (3)
The rate cost indicates the extra bits to introduce randomness
for providing secrecy against the eavesdropper [6] in a code-
word. A length n wiretap code is constructed by generating
2nRb codewords xn(w, v), where w = 1, 2, · · · , 2nRs and v =
1, 2, · · · , 2n(Rb−Rs). For each message index w, we randomly
select v from
{
1, 2, · · · , 2n(Rb−Rs)
}
with uniform probability and
transmit the codeword xn(w, v).
B. Transmission Scheme
In this paper, we consider a fixed-rate transmission scheme,
where the transmission rates, i.e., Rb and Rs, are fixed over
time. Bob and Eve are assumed to perfectly know their own
channels. Hence, the values of Cb and Ce are known by
Bob and Eve, respectively. Alice has the statistical knowledge
of Bob and Eve’s channels but does not know about the
instantaneous channel capability. We further assume that Bob
provides a one-bit feedback about his channel quality to Alice
in order to avoid unnecessary transmissions [7], [8]. The
one-bit feedback enables an on-off transmission scheme to
avoid connection outage. It is assumed that the transmission
takes place only when Rb ≤ Cb [4]. Therefore, the on-
off transmission scheme incurs a probability of transmission,
which is given by
ptx = P (Rb ≤ Cb) = exp
(
−2
Rb − 1
γ¯b
)
. (4)
C. Metrics
We adopt the average information leakage rate and the
throughput to measure the secrecy performance and the rate
performance of the system, respectively.
Average information leakage rate is derived from fractional
equivocation ∆ and confidential information rate Rs, which is
given by [4]
RL = E {(1 − ∆)Rs} . (5)
Therein, the fractional equivocation ∆ characterizes the level
at which the eavesdropper is confused [9] because of the dy-
namism of the wireless channel. Thus, the average information
leakage rate tells how fast the information is leaked to the
eavesdropper. In the fixed-rate on-off transmission system, (5)
can be further derived as [4]
RL =
1
ln 2
exp
(
1
γ¯e
) (
Ei
(
−2
Rb
γ¯e
)
− Ei
(
−2
Rb−Rs
γ¯e
))
, (6)
where Ei(x) =
∫ x
−∞
exp(t)
t dt is the exponential integral function.
We can find that RL is increasing on Rs and decreasing on Rb.
Throughput is a widely-adopted metric to measure the
confidential information received by an intended user in a real-
world communication system. In our system, the throughput
is given by
η = ptxRs = exp
(
−2
Rb − 1
γ¯b
)
Rs. (7)
Note that η is increasing on Rs and decreasing on Rb.
D. Cases
To thoroughly understand the trade-off between throughput
and information leakage rate, we consider the following two
cases in secure transmission designs:
• Case 1: Maximizing throughput with average information
leakage rate constraint is considered. This case represents
the scenario where the throughput of the transmission is
given the priority and the security is secondary to be
considered.
• Case 2: Minimizing average information leakage rate
with throughput constraint is considered. This case rep-
resents the scenario where the security of the wireless
link is first taken into consideration and the throughput
is subordinate.
The above two cases summarize many widely-used wireless
communication services like video call and mobile payment
in practice, thus are of great significance to consider.
III. System Design with Approximation
The implicit exponential integral function that is involved in
average information leakage rate hinders the analytic analysis
and incurs a high computation complexity in obtaining the
optimal transmission rates of secure transmission. Although
there are many existing works on approximations for the
exponential integral function, none of them works in se-
cure transmission designs directly. Consequently, an easy-to-
evaluate approximation is desired for further research on the
throughput-information leakage rate trade-off. To tackle this
obstacle and examine the role of information leakage rate in
wireless communication systems, in this section, we firstly
propose a reasonable approximation for average information
leakage rate. Subsequently, we detail optimal secure trans-
mission design in the above two cases with the obtained
approximation. At last, based on the approximation, analytical
analysis is given at the end of each case.
A. Approximation for the Average Information Leakage Rate
To settle the obstacle brought by exponential integral func-
tion, we propose an approximation for average information
leakage rate with the help of Abramowitz and Stegun’s upper
and lower bounds of Ei(·) [10] and classical Lagrange’s mean
value theorem [11]. We denote RLp as the approximation for
RL when γ¯b is large. Note that large Rb will contribute to
a high transmission rate of confidential information or high
secrecy cost for preventing confidential information leaked.
Thus, consideration of large Rb is of practical interest for
the study on physical layer security. The approximation is
summarized into the following proposition.
Proposition 1 Approximation for the average information
leakage rate, when γ¯b is large, is given by
RLp =
3γ¯e exp
(
1
γ¯e
)
10 ln 2
2Rs − 1
2Rb
. (8)
Proof: See Appendix A.
As shown in (8), RLp is the simple combination of basic
functions and does not involve the exponential integral func-
tion Ei(·), which makes it much easier to use and analyze.
Based on the derived approximation, we can now derive the
closed-form approximate optimal secure transmission rates in
the following two different cases.
B. Approximate the Optimal Transmission Rates for Case 1
In Case 1, the system maximizing throughput subject to
average information leakage rate constraint is considered, and
the optimization problem is formulated as
max
Rb,Rs
η = exp
(
−2
Rb − 1
γ¯b
)
Rs , (9)
s.t. RL ≤ ξ , 0 ≤ Rs ≤ Rb, (10)
where ξ is the maximum average information leakage rate
permitted in this transmission system.
Problem reformulation. With the approximation in Propo-
sition 1, an approximate optimization problem for Case 1 is
obtained, which is given by
max
Rb,Rs
η = exp
(
−2
Rb − 1
γ¯b
)
Rs , (11)
s.t. RLp ≤ ξ , 0 ≤ Rs ≤ Rb . (12)
Feasibility of constraint ξ. To obtain the feasible range of ξ
is equivalent to determine the maximum average information
leakage rate. Given any Rb, we find that ∂RLp/∂Rs is more than
0. Hence given any Rb, it is wise to have maximum Rs, i.e.,
Rs = Rb, for maximizing RLp. Then by having Rb approaching
+∞, the upper bound of RLp is obtained. Thus, feasible range
of ξ is given by
0 < ξ ≤
3γ¯e exp
(
1
γ¯e
)
10 ln 2
. (13)
Approximate optimal transmission rates. We denote W0(·)
as the principal branch of the Lambert W function and
A =
10 ln 2 exp
(
− 1γ¯e
)
3γ¯e
. The closed-form optimal secure trans-
mission rates for the approximate optimization problem are
summarized into the following proposition.
Proposition 2 Approximate optimal transmission rates of the
system maximizing throughput subject to average information
leakage rate constraint are given by
R∗s1 = log2
(
1 + ξA2R
∗
b1
)
(14)
and
R∗b1 = max
(
Rb1,min , Rb1,0
)
, (15)
where
Rb1,min = − log2 (1 − ξA) (16)
and
Rb1,0 = log2
(
exp (W0 (ξAγ¯b)) − 1
ξA
)
. (17)
Proof: See Appendix B.
Analysis based on Proposition 2. From Proposition 2, im-
portant observations could be obtained. When ξ = 0, we find
that R∗s1 = 0, which implies no confidential information is
transmitted if no information leakage is permitted. In this situ-
ation, the communication system is meaningless because only
random noises is transmitted. Because Rb1,min is increasing and
Rb1,0 is decreasing with respect to ξ, respectively, Rb1,min and
Rb1,0 may encounter at a certain value of ξ, ξ0, where ξ0 is
the solution of the equation Rb1,0 = Rb1,min. When ξ exceeds
ξ0, we have R∗b1 = Rb1,min and R
∗
s1 = R
∗
b1, which leads to zero
secrecy cost. In this situation, the secure system is incapable,
for no confidential information is shield from the eavesdropper
over the wireless channel. The observations reveals that both
too stringent and too loose security constraints will result in
impractical communication systems.
C. Approximate the Optimal Transmission Rates for Case 2
In Case 2, the system minimizing average information
leakage rate subject to throughput constraint is taken into
account. The optimization problem is formulated as
min
Rs,Rb
RL =
1
ln 2
exp
(
1
γ¯e
) (
Ei
(
−2
Rb
γ¯e
)
− Ei
(
−2
Rb−Rs
γ¯e
))
, (18)
s.t. η ≥ Γ , 0 ≤ Rs ≤ Rb , (19)
where Γ represents the minimum throughput required in this
transmission system.
Problem reformulation. With the approximation in Propo-
sition 1, an approximate optimization problem for Case 2 is
obtained, which is given by
min
Rs,Rb
RLp =
3γ¯e exp
(
1
γ¯e
)
10 ln 2
2Rs − 1
2Rb
, (20)
s.t. η ≥ Γ , 0 ≤ Rs ≤ Rb . (21)
Feasibility of constraint Γ. For fixed Rb, we find that
∂η/∂Rs is always positive. Hence for fixed Rb, we have
the maximum Rs, i.e., Rs = Rb, for maximizing η. Then,
by solving the equation ∂η(Rs=Rb)
∂Rb
= 0, the Rb maximizing
η (Rs = Rb) is obtained, which is equal to
Wo(γ¯b)
ln 2 . Thus, the
feasible range of Γ is given by
0 ≤ Γ ≤ Wo(γ¯b)
ln 2
exp
1 − 2Wo (γ¯b )ln 2γ¯b
 . (22)
Approximate optimal transmission rates. We denote Rb2,min
and Rb2,max as the solutions of x to exp
(
1−2x
γ¯b
)
x = Γ, where
Rb2,min < Rb2,max. The optimal transmission rates for the
approximate optimization problem are summarized into the
following proposition.
Proposition 3 Approximate optimal transmission rates of the
system minimizing average information leakage rate subject
to throughput constraint are given by
R∗s2 = Γ exp
(
2R
∗
b2 − 1
γ¯b
)
(23)
and
R∗b2 =

Rb2,min , if Rb2,0 < Rb2,min ,
Rb2,0 , if Rb2,min ≤ Rb2,0 ≤ Rb2,max ,
Rb2,max , if Rb2,max < Rb2,0 ,
(24)
where
Rb2,0 = log2
(
1 + γ¯b ln
(
ln B
Γ ln 2
))
(25)
and B is the solution of x to the equation
x ln (x) ln
(
1
Γ ln 2
exp
(
1
γ¯b
)
ln (x)
)
− x + 1 = 0 . (26)
Proof: See Appendix C.
Analysis based on Proposition 3. With the optimal secure
transmission rates given in Proposition 3, insightful observa-
tions could be obtained. When Γ = 0, we have R∗s2 = 0, which
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Fig. 1. : Throughput versus average information leakage rate constraint with
γ¯e = 3dB in Case 1.
implies that all the codeword transmission bits are leveraged to
provide secrecy against the eavesdropper. In this situation, the
system is unprofitable for no useful information is transmitted.
When Γ = Wo(γ¯b)ln 2 , we find that R
∗
s2 = R
∗
b2, which demonstrates
that the secrecy cost is maximum for any given Rb and all the
codeword transmission bits are occupied by the confidential
information. In this situation, the system is unsafe because
no confidential information is shield from eavesdropping over
the wireless channel. The observations also tell that both too
stringent and too loose throughput constraint will make the
communication system impractical.
IV. Numerical Results
In this section, we present the numerical results for wireless
systems with γ¯e = 3dB and different levels of γ¯b to demon-
strate the role of information leakage on secure transmission
designs. In each figure, the exact curve is obtained by numer-
ically solving the optimization problem (9) or (18), however,
the approximate curve is obtained by Proposition 2 or 3.
We first present throughput versus security constraint sub-
ject to different levels of Bob’s average SNR in Case 1. Fig. 1
shows that η is an upward convex non-decreasing function
of ξ. And there exists a limitation on the throughput as the
security constraint increases, which means much too loose
security constraint does not contribute to higher throughput
in this case. Another observation is that the system with a
higher γ¯b achieves higher throughput. But when the security
constraint is very small, the difference in throughput between
the systems is small. It is worth noting that the observations
above are founded on both the exact and approximate curves.
In addition, the maximum absolute error of the approximate
curves with γ¯b = 10dB and γ¯b = 13dB are less than 0.2 and
0.1, respectively, which indicates the approximation of Ei(·)
is reasonable in Case 1.
We then focus on secrecy cost versus security constraint
for different systems in Case1. As depicted in Fig. 2, φ is
a non-increasing function of ξ. And there exists a certain
value, beyond which the secrecy cost equals zero as the
security constraint increases. This observation confirms our
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analytic analysis that when ξ exceeds ξ0, R∗s1 = R
∗
b1. We also
find that the system with better main channel quality pays a
higher secrecy cost against eavesdropping. We can see these
observations found on both the exact and approximate curves.
Additionally, the maximum absolute distances between the
exact and approximate curves with γ¯b = 10dB and γ¯b = 13dB
are less than 0.25 and 0.2, respectively.
Next, we illustrate average information leakage rates versus
throughput constraint subject to different levels of Bob’s aver-
age SNR in Case 2. As shown in Fig. 3, average information
leakage rate is a lower convex increasing function of Γ.
However, there is no limitation on information leakage rate
like throughput in Case 1. We also observed that the system
with a higher γ¯b has a lower average information leakage
rate. However, when the throughput constraint is very small,
the difference in average information leakage rate between the
systems is small. Note that the maximum absolute error of RLp
with γ¯b = 10dB and γ¯b = 13dB are less than 0.1 and 0.05,
respectively, which indicates the approximation is reasonable
in Case 2, too.
Finally, we show secrecy cost versus throughput constraint
for different communication systems in Case 2. As depicted in
Fig. 4, the secrecy cost decreases as the throughput constraint
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and γ¯e = 3dB in Case 2.
increases. And the secrecy cost goes to zero at the upper
bound of the throughput constraint. The observation testifies
our analytical analysis that when Γ = Wo(γ¯b)ln 2 , R
∗
s2 = R
∗
b2. We
also observe that the system with a high average main channel
SNR obtains more secrecy cost for more random noises
in the codeword transmission rate needed to disturbing the
eavesdropper for secure transmission. Note that the maximum
absolute distances between exact and approximate curves in
two systems are both less than 0.4.
V. Conclusion
In this work, we investigate secure transmission designs
from an information leakage perspective. Specifically, to ad-
dress the obstacle brought by exponential integral function, we
proposed a reasonable approximation for average information
leakage rate. Based on the proposed approximation, the opti-
mal transmission rates in two cases are obtained, respectively.
Through analytical and numerical results, we found that for
the system maximizing throughput subject to information
leakage rate constraint, the throughput is an upward convex
non-decreasing function of the security constraint. However,
for the system minimizing information leakage rate subject
to throughput constraint, the average information leakage
rate is a lower convex increasing function of the throughput
constraint. Additionally, in each case, a higher average Bob’s
SNR contributes to better throughput or security performance
over the wireless channel. It is worth noting that all insightful
observations are found on both the exact and approximate
curves and the maximum absolute error in all figures are
low, which testifies the proposed approximation is reasonable.
Altogether, these results provide some important insights on
information leakage in secure transmission designs.
Appendix A
Proof of Proposition 1
From RL = 1ln 2 exp
(
1
γ¯e
) (
Ei
(
− 2Rb
γ¯e
)
− Ei
(
− 2Rb−Rs
γ¯e
))
, we find
that to approximate RL is mainly to approximate
O = Ei
(
− x
γ¯e
)
− Ei
(
− x
γ¯ey
)
, (27)
where x and y denote 2Rb and 2Rs , for simplicity, respectively.
With Abramowitz and Stegun’s bounds of Ei(·) [10], we have
O ≈ − 1
2
exp
(
− x
γ¯e
)
ln
(
1 +
2γ¯e
x
)
+ exp
(
− x
γ¯ey
)
ln
(
1 +
γ¯ey
x
)
.
(28)
With infinitesimal equivalence, ln
(
1 + 2γ¯ex
)
≈ 2γ¯ex and
ln
(
1 + γ¯eyx
)
≈ γ¯eyx when γ¯b is large. By doing the corresponding
equivalence infinitesimal replacement in (28), we have
O ≈ − 1
2
exp
(
− x
γ¯e
)
2γ¯e
x
+ exp
(
− x
γ¯ey
)
γ¯ey
x
=
γ¯e
x
(
y exp
(
− x
γ¯ey
)
− exp
(
− x
γ¯e
))
=γ¯e
y − 1
x
y exp
(
− x
γ¯ey
)
− exp
(
− x
γ¯e
)
y − 1
 . (29)
We denote f (z) = z exp
(
− x
γ¯ez
)
and f (z) with respect to z is
continuous and differentiable on closed interval
[
1, y
]
. From
Lagrange’s mean value theorem [11], there exists a point c in
(1 , y) such that f
′
(c) = f (y)− f (1)y−1 . Hence, we have
O ≈ f ′ (c)γ¯e y − 1x . (30)
Besides, when 1 ≤ x ≤ ∞ and 1 ≤ z ≤ x, we have 0 < f ′ (z) <
1. By setting α = f
′
(c), we obtain
O ≈ αγ¯e y − 1x , (31)
where α ∈ (0 , 1). To reduce computational complexity in our
problem, we empirically set α = 3/10, which provides good
accuracy. Recalling that x = 2Rb and y = 2Rs , we have the
approximation in (8). This completes the proof.
Appendix B
Proof of Proposition 2
From the constraint condition RLp ≤ ξ, we have
Rs ≤ log2
(
1 + ξA2Rb
)
. (32)
Given any Rb, we find that ∂η/∂Rs is always more than 0.
Hence given any Rb, it is wise to have the maximum Rs, i.e.,
Rs = log2
(
1 + ξA2Rb
)
, for maximizing η. Thus, R∗s1 is obtained
in (14). Additionally, with Rs = log2
(
1 + ξA2Rb
)
and Rs ≤ Rb,
the feasible range of Rb is given by
Rb1,min = − log2 (1 − ξA) ≤ Rb. (33)
Then, we can rewrite the optimization problem as
max
Rb
η|Rs=log2(1+ξA2Rb ) , (34)
s.t Rb1,min ≤ Rb . (35)
Finally, by solving for Rs in the equation
∂η(Rb)
∂Rb
= 0, the only
maximum value point Rb1,0 can be obtained in (17). Hence,
R∗b1 is obtained in (15). This completes the proof.
Appendix C
Proof of Proposition 3
From the constraint condition η ≥ Γ, we have
Rs ≥ Γ exp
(
2Rb − 1
γ¯b
)
. (36)
Given any Rb, we find that ∂RLp/∂Rs is always more than 0.
Hence given any Rb, it is wise to have the minimum Rs, i.e.,
Rs = Γ exp
(
2Rb−1
γ¯b
)
, for minimizing RLp. Thus, R∗s2 is given in
(23).
Then, as analyzed in obtaining the feasibility of Γ, given
any Rb, it is wise to have the maximum Rs, i.e., Rs = Rb, for
maximizing η. Hence, we can obtain the feasible range of Rb
for satisfying the throughput constraint by solving Rs in the
equation η(Rs = Rb) = Γ. The feasible range is given by
Rb2,min ≤ Rb ≤ Rb2,max. (37)
Consequently, the optimization problem can be rewrite as
min
Rb
RLp|Rs=Γ exp
(
2Rb −1
γ¯b
) , (38)
s.t. Rb2,min ≤ Rb ≤ Rb2,max . (39)
Finally, the minimum value point Rb2,0 can be obtained by
solving for Rb in the equation
∂RLp(Rb)
∂Rb
= 0. We find that the
closed-form solution of Rb2,0 is mathematically intractable. We
can numerically obtain Rb2,0 by (25) and (26). Thus, R∗b2 is
given in (24). This completes the proof.
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